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Sandy Hook Nike Radar Site
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Archiving more old personal slides, I found this close up of Nike elevated on launcher at C Batt 54th BN Edgewood, MD 1957 Note four antennae below [Cannard] steering fins to receive steering commands from Missile Track Radar. |
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Soon after I arrived at C-54 at Edgewood, I
saw that the men were trying to remove some enormous stumps to
clean up the site. some stumps were almost 5-feet in
diameter. The men had dug large holes around them, pulled
with trucks and chains or doused the stumps with diesel fuel, time
after time and tried to burn them out. No success on anything
over a foot. They asked me if we could blast.
Ok, having been stationed at Edgewood
previously, I knew all kinds of people on post. I called some
friends in Technical Escort [for hazardous materials] or EOD for
some TNT or dynamite. No such luck but they offered all the
bomb bursters I wanted from chemical bombs they were dismantling.
These were cardboard tubes about 1.25" diameter and 4' long filled
with something like cast Amatol [forget now]. The tubes could be
broken into small pieces across one's knee. They brought a supply
of bursters, blasting caps, wire and a 10-cap blasting machine.
All the stumps were quite far from the radar
antennas and vans. When blasting, we took cover in the doorway of
the old bombproof shelter near the gate. I tried small mudcap
charges or some drilled into the stumps and managed to blow off modest
chunks. My friends returned to check progress and said I was
using way too small charges. They set a big one and got
big results. On their second or third big try [probably one in the
photo] a piece of wood flew almost all the way to one of the antennas.
I declared an end to that job.
They came up with one better. They
brought out a truck load of napalm drop [maybe 1 foot diameter and 4
feet long in wood-frame crates. tanks that were also being destroyed.
We would stick some down in a hole dug around a stump, make some holes
in it with a pick, splash on some gas and drop a match. Nice slow
fire would burn out the stump. On the biggest remaining stump, we
set about 5 drop tanks and lit it off on Friday afternoon. That
was the weekend it snowed almost 4 feet. On Monday, we
plowed our way out to the stump and voila [sorry, to hell with the
French] the hole was empty, coated with white ash and still very
hot.
good fun
Elliot
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The NIKE AJAX Explosion
Here is a story I may have recounted several
years ago, but I now have an illustration for it.
Ed Thelen has a nice write up on his web
page concerning the NJ Nike
explosion: http://ed-thelen.org/mono-7.html The NIKE AJAX Explosion "Suddenly the missile blew with a roar and a sky-searing pillow of orange flame from burning kerosene and nitric acid Fuels... Explosion and flame touched off seven more Nikes squatting on adjacent pads, blew or burned ten med to death, showered a three-mile radius with fragments..."21 On a sunny afternoon, 22 May 1958, the first fatal NIKE accident occurred at the site of Battery B, 526th AAA Missile Battalion, near the small towns of Middletown and Leonardo, New Jersey. Six soldiers and four civilians were killed; three men were seriously injured; windows were blown out of houses for miles around; the sound of the blast was heard for fifteen miles. The Army rushed experts to the scene from New York and Washington, D.C. The mayor of Middletown called a special town meeting, to which top-ranking officers of the New York Defense Area were invited to explain what happened. Newspaper and magazine editors were on hand to say "I told you so."22 Army lawyers began to settle claims for shattered windows and broken bric-a-brac. At the time of the disaster, 14 missiles were located aboveground: 7 in A Section, 4 in B Section, and 3 in C Section. The explosion apparently originated with a missile undergoing modification in A Section. Here, an Ordnaace team, in conjunction with the using unit, was replacing two M27 (T93) Safety & Arming Mechanisms with two improved models, M30 or M30A1, in accordance with Modification Work Order (MWO) Y2-W20. Aside from installation instructions, the MWO kit consisted of two brackets, two place assemblies, the necessary attaching hardware for the M30 devices, and two nameplates for the missile. To replace the arming mechanism, two of the three warheads in the missile (nose and center warheads weighing 12 and 179 Ibs., respectively) had to be removed. A crater in front of the missile position suggested that these varheads were lying on the ground at the time of the explosion (see Figure 46, next page). Somewhere in the process of removing the old devices and brackets and replacing them with the new ones, the missile was accidentally detonated. All seven missiles of A Section exploded. The nearest adjoining missile In B Section apparently did not explode but its booster was ignites by a flying red-hot pellet and it blasted into the side of a nearby hill. Failure of this missile to explode may have saved the remaining six missiles. Alpha Section seen from direction of the Assembly building. Explosion apparently originated between launching positioin four at far left and launching position trhee at center. Arrow points to crater about three feet deep where nose and center warheads removed from missile that was being modified are believed to have been placed. Metal frameworth has all been extensively perforated by pelletes from exploding warheads. (Avaition Week Photo, June 2, 1958) Figure 46 A Board of Officers was immediately convened by the 1st Region, U. S. Army Air Defense Command, Fort Totten, New York, to investigate the accident.23 The findings of the board indicated that the "point of initiation of the explosion was probably a PGPN relay cap" but just which relay cap could not be determined. The "most likely causes of the detonation of the PETN relay cap which initiated the disaster" were listed as follows: "(1) Excessive tightening of a detonating cord coupling more than finger tight. "(2) Use of unauthorised materials such as string, solder wire, or aluminum wire around the detonating cord, next to the cellar, in order to mate the PGI1J relay cap fit more snugly. "(3) 'Cross-threading' the detonating cord coupling nut while screwing it into the five-way connector or into the varhead adapter . "(4) Scraping, crushing, pinching, or othewise damaging the PETN relay cap in some manner.24 As a direct result of this accident and the investigation that followed, it was determined that an unauthorized field fix25 relating to MWO Y2-W20 had been applied to an undetermined number of AJAX missiles on site, thus creating a hazardous condition which was general throughout the CONUS. The new arming device was considered a vast improvement for AJAX missiles, both in reliability and safety of operation; however, the unauthorized fix eliminated the safety tolerance desired between the warhead initiator and the PETN relay cap on the detonating cord harness assembly. The elimination of this tolerance by application of the "field fix" created a serious safety hazard in the form of possible order detonation. Accordingly, the Commanding General of the Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM) notified all commands and installations concerned that on-site missiles with an unauthorized fix applied "are potential safety hazards and further unnecessary movement, assembly, or disassembly of loaded msls must not occur until inspection and necessary removal by qualiiied Ord personnel..." It was also directed that immediate and positive action be talren to stop application of the unauthorized fix and to thoroughly indoctrinate personnel in the necessity of refraining from the application of changes or modifications to material without proper technical service approral.26 "Operation Fix-It" In June 1958, the necessary procedures, special equipment, and drawings were completed for removal of the unauthorized fix applied to NIKE AJAX Missiles at certain tactical sites. Five Ordnance depots (Letterkenny, Seneca, Savanna, Pueblo, and Umatilla) were selected to perform the task, with personnel being fully oriented in procedures and use of equipment. The scope of the operation--commonly referred to as "Operation Fix-It"-initially encconpassed only those missiles known or suspected of containing this unauthorized modification; however, both CONARC and ARADCOM agreed on 28 June 1958, that the scope should be broadened to include all missiles on site, in order to eliminate defective explosive harness assemblies.27 The operation was completed on 30 August 1958. In the process, a 100% inspection was made of all warhead missiles within the Continental United States and some warhead missiles in the European Command.28 In addition to checking for and removing the unauthorized fix, other discrepancies noted were investigated and corrected. Of the 5,971 warhead missiles inspected at tactical sites in the CONUS,605 contained the unauthorised fix and 309 had ruptured and/or damaged relay caps. In the European Command, the unauthorised fix was removed iron 9 of the 10 warhead missiles processed.29 Thus, 923 chances of another disaster had been caught in time and eliminated. What happened at our unit after the accident: Confusing and contradictory operational and safety directives began arriving within a few hours. "Don't touch the missiles" and "only one missile to be above ground at one time" [except for an "actual alert"] were those I best recall. Then came orders to examine all missiles for possible defects in the firing circuits. Contractors [or Engineers] erected a new, earth-revetted area at the other-end of the launchers from the fueling revetment in which to work.
Tech reps and top missile technicians
performed the examinations. I recall being present at the first
tests and some later ones. I particularly remember finding
some "irregularities" in the connections between the primacord
lines and the components. See diagram. Best remembered
was that unknown parties [probably at initial missile
assembly] had inserted "shim rings" of wire solder
around the primacord, most likely to snug the "hand-tite-only"
connectors. And, there were 10 connections to open and check on
each missile - one on each of three warheads, 5 on the 5-way
connector and one on each of two arming mechanisms.
Through all this confusion, we
managed to maintain alert status throughout our defense and
eventually we returned to normal but modified operations.
Added Notes: The
accident took place at NY-58L Leonardo/Belford on 15 April 1958, while
occupied by B/526th. Other than the earlier inadvertent launch of an
Ajax from W-13T at Fort Meade, it was the only Nike accident and the only
one to result in major damage and casualties.- MK standard initiation for each new, young battery officer
There was a standard initiation for each
new, young battery officer reporting to his first duty station
after school. I was lucky and did well at Ft Bliss because
friends provided me with after-hours, pre-school training on a Nike
Ajax missile system. It helped me do better in school and, as a
life-long, immature, practical joker I learned of this trick and also
developed a few non-destructive, technical practical jokes of
my own. In a way I regret not reacting to all their hard work to
fool me, but by doing so, I played a joke on them. Some of my
terminology may not be correct after 45 years but I think you will all
get the idea.
[This account may seem overly
long because, for those interested, I tried to explain all the technical
details while I still remember - anything. If anyone wishes to use
or reprint the story, feel free to edit it to suit your purposes -
Elliot]
Soon after reporting for duty, a
new officer would be seated at the Battery Control Officer's (BCO)
console and asked to prove himself by performing a
"missile firing drill". Experienced officers would
oversee and rate his performance with the equipment and full crews in
both IFC and Launcher areas. It was both a first test of
the new officer but repetitive training for the men.
The drill started with selecting a
live aircraft (in the area) with the acquisition radar,
assigning that aircraft to the target tracking radar
(for actual tracking), "ordering" the missile
tracking radar to lock onto the guidance unit of an
erected missile and initiating the simulated firing process in
the computer. The computer's drill program would
then simulate an actual firing. The status board
lights would change from red to green, the target pin
on the plotting board would track the target and,
at the proper time, the new BCO was supposed to
raise the safety cover and press the fire switch. In a real
firing, as soon as the missile moved about 1/2 inch from a
micro switch on the launcher rail, the missile-away
status light would change from red to green. In
a drill, as soon as the fire switch was pressed, the missile
tracking pin on the plotting board would
follow the missile's computer-directed simulated trajectory. If
everything was done right, all the indicators and the plotting
board would reveal whether or not the missile detonated
at a pre-determined offset distance from the target to
achieve maximum fragment damage.
THE JOKE In those
days the school did not teach the BCO that in
drills, he should issue a command to the launch
control officer (LCO) to "verify
booster squib not connected". [The launcher crew always
disconnected booster squibs in drills.] When the LCO
detected the fire command, he signaled his launcher crew literally
to crowbar the missile far enough up the rail to activate the micro
switch and display the missile-away light [which was
not supposed to happen in a drill.] [Most
BC Officers wore two headsets, taped together,
one connected to the IFC network and the other
connected to the Launcher network. The BCO could
control his communications by pressing one, the other, or both
press-to-talk switches.] Next, a launcher crewman
inserted a headset microphone into the cone of a CO2 fire extinguisher
and triggered the extinguisher. The gas flow created a loud
roar in the BC Officer's launcher headset. At that instant,
another officer in the Battery Control Van yelled
out in simulated horror, [something like] "you fired a
missile. - you might as well see it fly, you just bought it." The
frightened new officer usually ran outside or opened an escape
hatch to see the results of his evil deed.
I enjoyed those days working in the
vans although lots of people found them boring. From time to time
I operated every console for experience and tried to master them but
probably never did. After a time, and experience, our Missile
Officer left and I was called up to BN to fill the slot. More
responsibility and I was the bastard who came out in the middle of the
night to run the ORI. If the battery passed, the BC and
the BN CO were both happy. If they failed, both were mad at me.
Your mention of the PPI and PI remind me of
another silly story. Before the battery converted to Herc, they
sent half the BN HQ to Bliss for training. The few BN officers
left behind really had to put in big time to share the staff duty
officer duties. The Herc equipment arrived and was installed.
We went out and tried it out and it was a blast compared to the old
shorter ranged Ajax.One night there was a mission and the BN XO said,
lets go out and run the Herc set in the practice mission. He
also wanted me to show him what I had learned - so we did. From 25
miles north east of Baltimore, we could lock on and track targets south
of Washington, and we did. We tracked and simulated firing on
targets way out of our normal Ajax range. We also called in "Mission
Accomplished" on those targets. Our controller at
missile Master began to question why we were engaging targets so far out -
the XO said we were testing the new set. On the next MO, the
controller asked which target - horrors, we had not even looked at the
Precision Indicator [just blip on the PPI] which showed four aircraft -
my answer was , "all sir, we used a "large warhead".
After expending many more missiles than we ever had in the magazine,
Missile Master asked where we were getting all the extra ammo. The
XO and I had a brief conference and decided on the answer that I
gave, "Same place you are getting the hostile targets,
sir."
After I was transferred to 35th Brigade HW
they razzed me about that for a long time.
Another recollection from
Baltimore-Washington. One of the officers in 35th Brig with whom I
served was connected with that first temporary site at Fort Meade
from which the first missile accidentally fired.
This man told us that the site's BC
and some men jumped in his car followed by more men in a truck to
recover the missile which had landed on the Baltimore Washington
Parkway. He said that the missile had broken up and acid was
spilled over everything. [apparently only the booster fired]
With rubber gloves, or something, the desperate BC threw the
most classified part of the missile into his car trunk while his men
recovered the other missile parts. Before long the floor of his trunk
'rotted out'. When it was all over, the poor guy was
transferred to a very dismal post in Alaska.
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TEST FIRING OF NIKE MISSILES AT SITES
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